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Home > Library > Stable Times > Volume 3, Issue 3

The quarterly publication of the Stable Value Investment Association
Third Quarter 1999 • Volume 3 Issue 3
Toward A New Model of Stable Value
By Jeff Norris, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Recent volatility in the equity
and fixed income markets has directed new attention to stable value funds
- those often misunderstood investment offerings of many defined contribution
plans. Sometimes tagged as overly conservative, the intermediate-term-bond-yields-with-no-price-volatility
characteristics of stable value now look, if not attractive, at least,
well, sensible. Plan participants, as a result, are acting sensibly and
reassessing both their "financial needs timelines" and their
"personal risk profiles," and are rebalancing their portfolios,
often increasing allocations to stable value.
Stable value has long derived its identity from the fixed income world
and, specifically from comparisons with money market funds, hence the
reason for some of the conservative stigma. Of course, stable value returns
have long trounced those of their money fund rivals.
But must stable value remain a step-child to fixed income? We think not.
In fact, the stable value asset class now has the opportunity to break
out of its historical role as the conservative savings plan option and
recapture the dominant position it held during the 1980s. In a reconstituted
format, it can add significant value to participants by way of increased
returns and reduced volatility when compared to other savings plan options.
Before looking at how this might happen, a glance back at how the asset
class evolved will shed some light on the challenges stable value will
face.
The Early Years of Stable Value
The original stable value offering was an insurance company contract that
was evergreen in design with return characteristics that matched those
of the insurer's general account. By definition, this meant that contracts
were largely backed by fixed income investments which were generally long
in duration. These were functions of both regulatory constraints and the
liability profile of the insurer.
Interest rate volatility in the 1980s had a profound effect on general
account-based products. When market rates went up, the result was a contractual
rate that lagged. (Of course, in fairness a longer duration portfolio
also results in lagging, that is, above-market rates when market rates
fall). Why should this have been a concern? Well, in these early days
of savings plans, the return on the fixed option was thought to have to
be competitive with what participants and potential participants would
see in a bank window. The savings plan was then seen to be competing with
non-tax advantaged savings alternatives! It was feared that plan contributions
might dry up if the bank CD rate was better than what could be obtained
within the plan. Because in these days the fixed fund would often garner
75% or more of participant contributions, an attractive credited rate
was deemed absolutely crucial to the overall viability of the plan.
In this rapidly rising interest rate environment, insurance company providers
worked to amend and restructure arrangements. Out of these efforts was
born the GIC and also the specialty GIC consultant.
The Birth of GICs
With a fixed rate, fixed maturity product that now allowed for competitive
bidding (no longer was the sponsor's fund underwritten by one provider)
the GIC services business flourished. Insurers were still the only source
of product and because stable value still looked more like a bond than
any other investment, it remained very much tied to fixed income. Determined
not to get caught
long in duration, GIC consultants almost to a person favored short-term
contracts. The objective was (and in many ways, still is) to beat money
market fund returns, but stay short enough to capture interest rate movement.
Rules of thumb recommending one-quarter to one-third turnover of the GIC
portfolio each year soon proliferated.
Perhaps the linkage of stable value with short duration fixed income returns
served the stable value market and the defined contribution plan well
in these early years. Double-digit returns on this conservative plan option
no doubt enticed many employees to participate in the plan, fueling its
popularity and growth. The importance of this can easily be lost in today's
context of higher participation rates and more savvy employee investors.
Managed GICs
The evolution of stable value took another step forward in 1989 with the
introduction of managed GICs (a.k.a. separate account GICs, synthetic
GICs). These products were essentially visible, segregated portfolios
of fixed income securities surrounded by a book value guarantee, also
called a wrapper. For purpose of our analysis, the important things to
note are: 1) for the first time, plan sponsors could have direct input
into the composition of the assets supporting their contract and, 2) the
book value guarantee was designed to smooth out the potential volatility
of investment returns, a mechanism previously buried and unseen in the
operation of the insurer's general account.
So we now had the two components which ten years later can form the basis
for our new stable value model -- asset choice and a smoothing function.
And yet, the uses of managed GICs in recent years have continued to focus
almost exclusively on fixed income securities. Within stable value, investment
management mandates have been surprisingly limited. High quality, domestic
securities benchmarked to intermediate duration indices overwhelmingly
dominate managed GIC portfolios.
Rethinking Stable Value
One has to question now, however, whether the stable value conventions
of today - borne out of the historical antecedents of defined contribution
plan and stable value practices - need continue:
- Is the plan still competing
with outside savings alternatives?
- Does stable value still
have to be tied to fixed income? To domestic fixed income?
- Does stable value still
need to be managed to short durations?
- Are money market funds the
true benchmark against which stable value should compete and be compared?
- Is tracking current market
interest rates really so important?
If the answer to any of the above
questions is no, it might just be time to re-tune our definition of stable
value. Maybe, it is time to ask a new question: what is stable value
anyway?
In response, let's imagine a new stable value world order where equities
and different classes of fixed income securities, heretofore rarely or
never utilized, come into play. In this world, the Stable Value Fund is
redefined as the Stable Diversified Asset Fund, perhaps similar to a balanced
fund, with an important distinction - the fund will always deliver
a positive return. This fund delivers market returns based upon the
underlying assets, but smooths the results via the book value wrapper.
Maximizing the Wrapper
To make this happen will require a re-thinking on the part of buyers and
sellers of the book value wrapper. In recent years, this component of
the managed GIC has been given short shrift. Commoditized through look-alike
contracts and price wars, which denigrate the importance of liability
management, the wrapper has become, for some, the necessary evil of stable
value. Buyers and sellers often convince each other that these benefit
withdrawal risks are de minimus.
Our new stable value world order reinstates the wrapper in its prominent
role as the "smoother extraordinaire" of the defined contribution
world. It takes the potentially volatile returns of equities and other
asset classes not heretofore associated with stable value and amortizes
the peaks and troughs. The end result for participants is that they can
now receive the higher returns of a more diversified asset portfolio,
and not simply enhanced money market returns. And through the magic of
modern portfolio theory, more diversification actually translates to safer.
It is not likely that all companies currently offering product to the
wrapper market will want to step up to the demands of this new model of
stable value. Sponsors and consultants will have the more challenging
assignment of separating out those providers who possess the necessary
skills to design and administer such an enhanced book value guarantee.
What about Performance?
If the facts alone ruled, our new model of stable value would be an easy
winner. As the analysis in the Appendix demonstrates, even the simple
decision to move to a benchmark longer in duration, (i.e., from intermediate
to broad market duration) can reasonably be expected to increase credited
rates with no negative impact on volatility. Sprinkling in other fixed
income assets and even including equities continues the pattern: higher
returns with lower volatility.
Can it Happen?
In conclusion, we might ask some final questions:
- Can the facts of "higher
returns with lower volatility" outweigh the emotions of "shorter
duration and higher quality" that is so much a part of current
stable value design?
- Is it possible that plan sponsors
and stable value providers will expand the boundaries of this asset
specialty and that stable value can become more than simply a revved-up
money market fund?
In fact, it has already begun
to happen. At MetLife, we have a small but growing list of clients who
have begun to augment their stable value funds by purchasing managed GICs
backed by something other than high quality domestic fixed income securities.
High yield and international fixed income, longer duration mandates and
even equities are currently being utilized. To date most of these allocations
are small. However, there is a clear trend toward opening up the investable
universe for stable value. The end result of pushing the frontier will
be a more robust stable value asset allocation which delivers better returns
to the ultimate beneficiaries.
APPENDIX
To determine the expected returns of adding non-traditional assets
to stable value we examined several portfolio constructions shown below.
Returns were calculated over the period 1989 - 1998.
|
Portfolio
|
Composition
|
|
A
|
Lehman Bros. Intermediate Government/ Corporate Bond Index
|
|
B
|
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index
|
|
C
|
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index (80%) + High Yield (20%)
|
|
D
|
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index (60%) + High Yield (20%) + International Bonds (20%)
|
|
E
|
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index (40%) + High Yield (20%) + International Bonds (20%) + S&P 500 (20%)
|
While relatively straightforward to compare on a market value basis, the
book value nature of stable value required that we artfully make and apply
certain assumptions to these portfolios for purposes of comparing credited
rates. These assumptions dictated the yield-to-maturity that we
utilized in our standard rate reset formula and the duration over
which we amortized market value performance.
| Asset Class |
Assumed Net Yield-to-Maturity* |
Amortization Period* |
| Intermediate duration bonds |
Lehman Bros. Intermediate Govt./Corp. Bond Index |
3.3 years |
| Market duration bonds |
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index |
4.5 years |
| High yield bonds |
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index + 0.60% |
4.6 years |
| International bonds |
Merrill Lynch Global Govt. Bond Index II (ex. U.S.) + 0.50% |
4.4 years |
| Equities |
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index + 2.00% |
7 years |
* Portfolios A - E use the weighted average of these depending upon the
portfolio composition.
The results confirm that more diversification can lead to higher returns
with reduced standard deviation.
| Portfolio |
Average Credited Rate |
Standard Deviation |
|
A
|
7.98%
|
0.88%
|
|
B
|
8.48%
|
0.82%
|
|
C
|
8.73%
|
0.50%
|
|
D
|
8.64%
|
0.53%
|
|
E
|
9.54%
|
0.34%
|
As a further exercise, the above numbers were recalculated utilizing a
standard amortization period of 3.3 years, consistent with Portfolio A.
This had the expected result of increasing both returns and volatility.
Plan sponsors will want to consult with their providers to model the effects
of various amortization schedules depending upon the assets they choose
to include.
| Portfolio |
Average Credited Rate |
Standard Deviation |
|
A
|
7.98%
|
0.88%
|
|
B
|
8.63%
|
0.95%
|
|
C
|
8.91%
|
0.63%
|
|
D
|
8.85%
|
0.76%
|
|
E
|
9.99%
|
0.60%
|
A final word of warning concerns
the sine qua non of any analysis based upon an historical fact pattern.
The past ten years, which provide the data for this examination have seen
strong bond market returns coupled with a raging bull market for equities,
both of which play a role in the results shown.
OPINIONS:
New Feature
SVIA's Stable Times is pleased to launch an OPINIONS feature.
OPINIONS' goal is to focus on new issues that captivate the
stable value industry and stimulate a dialogue among the membership.
Jeff Norris has kindly volunteered to launch OPINIONS with
his article, Toward A new Model of Stable Value.
OPINIONS' represents the views of the author. Opinion articles
do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Editorial Board or
the Association. If you wish to submit a response to this article
for the next issue of Stable Times, please contact Scott Matirne
(202) 467-8013 or scott@stablevalue.org. |
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